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Abstract
Economists and demographers have long argued that fertility differs by income (differen-
tial fertility), and that social security creates incentives for people to rear fewer children. Does
the effect of social security on fertility differ by income? How does social security change the
cross-sectional relationship between fertility and income? Does social security further affect
the dynamics of the earnings distribution by changing differential fertility? We answer these
questions in a three-period OLG model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous fertility.
We argue that given its redistributional property, social security affects people’s fertility be-
havior differentially by income. In the model, earning ability is transmitted from parents to
children. Hence, social security can have a significant impact on the dynamics of the earnings
distribution through its effects on differential fertility. The mechanism used in the model to
generate differential fertility is novel. We follow the line of the “old-age security” hypothesis
and assume that children are an investment good in parents’ old-age consumption. Thus,
the optimal fertility choice depends on how much transfer is expected from children in rela-
tion to the cost of rearing these children to adult life. Since the intergenerational earnings
process is mean-reverting, poor (rich) parents tend to have more (fewer) children because
they have lower (higher) child-rearing cost and expect their children will have higher (lower)
earnings than themselves and give back relatively more (less) in transfers. Social security
reduces fertility by substituting children out of parents’ old-age portfolio. It reduces fertility
of the poor proportionally more than it reduces fertility of the rich because social security
payments are a larger portion of old-age savings for poor people. These results are consistent
with features of the U.S. fertility data. We calibrate the model to the U.S. data and find
that social security can explain 32% of the decline in poor-rich fertility differential between
the cohort of women born during 1891-1895 and the cohort of women born during 1946-1950.
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1 Introduction
Fertility differs by income (differential fertility). For example, Jones and Tertilt (2007) find a
negative cross-sectional relationship between income and fertility within all cohorts of women
since 1826 in the United States (see figure 1). This negative relationship between income and
fertility has also been found in most other countries.1 Economists and demographers have
also argued that government provided social security creates incentives for people to rear fewer
children.2 In this paper, we ask whether the effect of social security on fertility varies across the
earnings distribution, and how social security changes differential fertility. We further ask how
social security affects the dynamics of the earnings distribution through its effects on differential
fertility.
To answer these questions, we develop a three-period OLG model with heterogeneous agents
and endogenous fertility. In the model, we follow the line of the “old-age security” hypothesis
(see Boldrin and Jones (2002) for details) and assume that children are investment goods from
the viewpoint of parents. Thus the optimal fertility choice depends on how much transfer is
expected from children in relation to the cost of rearing these children to adult life. The cost of
rearing children is only the parent’s time. We further assume that earning ability is transmitted
from parents to children, and it is mean-reverting over generations. Therefore, in this model,
poor (rich) parents tend to have more (fewer) children since they have lower (higher) child-
rearing cost and expect that their children will have higher (lower) earnings than themselves
and give back relatively more (less) in transfers.
In this setup, social security payments crowd children out of parents’ old-age portfolios. Since
government-provided social security is usually very progressive, its payments are a larger portion
of old-age savings for poor people.3 Therefore, social security tends to reduce the fertility of
the poor proportionally more than it reduces the fertility of the rich. Since earning ability is
intergenerationally correlated, a smaller fertility differential between the poor and the rich can
lead to a new earnings distribution with a smaller portion of poor people and a higher average
earnings level.
Crucial assumptions in the model are that earning ability is intergenerationally correlated
and mean-reverting. These assumptions are supported by overwhelming empirical evidence.
Gary Becker (1988) has argued that “In every country with data that I have seen... earnings
1See E. Jones (1982).
2For example, Boldrin, De Nardi, and Jones (2005), Ehrlich and Kim (2007), etc.
3OECD (2007) summarizes the progressivity of pension systems in the OECD countries. It finds that New
Zealand and Ireland have a pure flat-rate pension system, while Finland, Italy and Netherlands have a highly
earnings-related pension system. The US social security system is somewhere in between these two groups of
countries.
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strongly regress to the mean between fathers and sons”. Solon (2002) summarizes empirical
studies for a number of developed countries, which all find supportive evidence for the argument
that earnings are intergenerationally correlated and mean-reverting.
Another important assumption in our model is that the parent’s motivation for child-rearing
is old-age security. This is in contrast to the Barro-Becker model, in which parental altruism is
the motivation of child-rearing (Barro and Becker, 1989, and Becker and Barro, 1988). This “old-
age security” hypothesis was first proposed by Caldwell (1978) in the demography literature.
Boldrin and Jones (2002) formalize Caldwell’s idea in a dynamic model of fertility. Our model
builds on the Boldrin-Jones model. Sizable empirical evidence has been found supporting the
“old-age security” hypothesis.4 Boldrin and Jones (2002) provide an excellent review of these
empirical studies.
Lastly, we apply our model to the U.S. data. We find that in our model, social security
can explain 32% of the decline in differential fertility between the cohort of women born during
1891-1895 and that born during 1946-1950 in the U.S.5
Our paper is motivated by the recent literature that studies the interactions between differ-
ential fertility and income and wealth inequality. The main message from this literature is that
what really matters is not only the aggregate fertility measures, but also the distribution of fer-
tility across income. For instance, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) argue that differential fertility
puts more weight on the poor in the next generation, and thus brings down the weighted average
income level of the population. Knowles (1999) argues that accounting for differential fertility is
important for understanding the U.S. wealth distribution, since parents treat children’s human
capital as part of their wealth. Kremer and Chen (2002) argue that differential fertility increases
the proportion of unskilled workers, and reduces their wages. Our study is built on this litera-
ture and it focuses on how government-provided public pension affects differential fertility and
its interaction with the dynamics of the earnings distribution.
This paper is closely related to papers by Boldrin and Jones (2002) and Boldrin, De Nardi
and Jones (2005). In both papers, children are an investment in parents’ old-age consumption
and the old-age transfer from children to parents is endogenous. Boldrin and Jones (2002) find
that their model can explain the historical correlation between the mortality rate and fertility
rate. However, they abstract from distributional issues by only studying a representative-agent
model. Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) study the negative impacts of social security on
fertility in the Boldrin-Jones model. They find that social security reduces the period Total
4For example, see Willis(1982), Lillard and Willis (1997), Nugent (1985), and Jensen (1990).
5In this paper, differential fertility means the negative relationship between fertility and income. The quanti-
tative measurement used for differential fertility is the fertility gap between the women in the top half of income
distribution and those in the bottom half of income distribution.
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Fertility Rate (TFR) and this effect is quantitatively important, but they do not explore the
possibility that social security may affect people’s fertility behavior differentially. In fact, the
literature on social security and fertility can be dated back to the 1960s. Most studies have
found that social security has a negative impact on the fertility rate.6 However, no one has
studied the differential effects that social security has on fertility.
This paper is also related to the literature that studies the fundamental determinants of the
great divergence over the last two hundred and fifty years (see Galor (2005)). Our theory suggests
that social security may have contributed to the latter half of the great divergence. A well
established fact in this literature is that the previously positive relationship between fertility and
income was reversed after the demographic transition of the mid 19th century. Note that after the
demographic transition, the negative fertility-income relationship not only held across countries,
but also held domestically within each country (see Jones and Tertilt (2007)). As de la Croix and
Doepke (2003) argue, the domestic negative fertility-income relationship puts more weight on
poor people in future generations, and therefore lowers the average income level in the long run.7
However, in the data we do not observe this growth-retarding effect in the Western countries
after the demographic transition; instead, these countries quickly completed the transition to
the stage of modern economic growth and started an economic take-off. Our theory suggests
that this may be due to the social security programs introduced in these Western countries
between the late 19th century and the early 20th century. Social security further lowered the
total fertility rate in these countries in addition to changes from the demographic transition
(Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)). Also, it lessened the domestic negative relationship
between fertility and income, thus offset the growth-retarding effect proposed by de la Croix
and Doepke. Meanwhile, in the rest of the world, most countries did not have a social security
program until much later. Thus, in these countries, this growth-retarding effect arrived after
the demographic transition, which slowed their growth and enlarged their gap with the West.
This paper also fits into the literature that studies the cross-sectional properties of various
family decisions and their interactions with inequality, using a heterogeneous-agent model.8
Among this literature, there are several papers especially relevant to this paper. Caucutt, Guner
and Knowles (2002) argue that both fertility and the timing of fertility differ across income
distribution. They develop an equilibrium search model with marriage and fertility and study
the interactions between wage inequality and differential marriage and fertility decisions of young
6Friedlander and Silber (1967), Hohm (1975), Swilder (1983), Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Cigno and Rosati
(1996), Rosati (1996), Zhang (2001), Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), etc.
7In another paper, they study the welfare results of different education policies when differential fertility is
taken into account (de la Croix and Doepke (2004)).
8For example, Bar and Leukhina (2007), Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2002), Greenwood, Guner and Knowles
(2003), Schoonbroodt (2003), etc.
4
women. Another important family decision which may have a significant impact on fertility is
female labor participation. Schoonbroodt (2003) studies the cross-sectional relationship between
female labor participation and income in the US. She finds that the increase in the female labor
participation rate has been independent of income throughout the twentieth century in the U.S.
This paper is distinguished from the existing literature in the following ways. First, we
are the first to explore the possibility that social security may affect people’s fertility behavior
differentially, to quantify the differential effects of social security on fertility, and to derive im-
plications for the dynamics of the earnings distribution. Second, we propose a novel mechanism
generating the negative cross-sectional relationship between fertility and income, in which the
mean-reversion in earnings over generations plays a key role. We show that this mechanism is
robust both theoretically and quantitatively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in the second section
and present some theoretical analysis on the cross-sectional relationship between income and
fertility in the third section. We illustrate the effect of social security on differential fertility and
its implication for the dynamics of the earnings distribution in the fourth section. We apply the
model to the US data in the fifth section and conclude in the sixth section.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of agents who live for three periods:
childhood, middle age, and old age. Agents are endowed with one unit of time only in their
middle age. They can use it either to work or to rear children. Agents receive a productivity
shock  at the beginning of the middle-age period and then jointly make savings, fertility,
consumption, and old-age transfers decisions to maximize their lifetime utility. In old age,
agents only consume what they have, which include the savings from their middle age and the
old-age transfers from their middle-age children. In childhood, agents don’t make any economic
decision. Let us think about the problem facing a middle-age agent with it, born in period t−1.
Here i = 1, ..., nt−1 and nt−1 is the fertility choice of this agent’s parent. This agent has the
following expected value of his lifetime utility,
u(cmt ) + βE[u(c
o
t+1)|it] + γu(
nt−1∑
j 6=i,j=1
djt + Tt(t−1) + d
i
t) (1)
with
u(c) = log c, (2)
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where cm is middle-age consumption and co is old-age consumption. Note that d is transfer to
the old-age parent, and d ≥ 0. The social security payment to the old-age parent is denoted by
Tt(t−1), which is a function of the parent’s productivity shock, t−1.9 Let j be the index for the
middle-age children of the agent’s parent, thus djt represents the old-age transfer from the jth
child. Here we assume the agent i takes djt , j 6= i and j = 1, ..., nt−1, as given when he makes
his own transfer decision.10
The first term and the second term in equation (1) are respectively the utility function for
the agent’s middle age and old age. The expectation is over the uncertainty a middle-age agent
has about his children’s productivity at the moment he makes his fertility choice. The third
term in equation (1) is the altruism function, which says that a middle-age child cares about
his old-age parent. It is a function of the agent’s own transfer to his parent dit, his siblings’
total transfers to his parent
∑nt−1
j 6=i,j=1 d
j
t , and the social security payment to his parent Tt(t−1).
We exclude the parent’s own old-age savings from the altruism function in order to prevent
the parent from playing strategically with his children.11 This specification of the altruism
function has several preferable features. First, the agent’s incentive for giving decreases as he
has more siblings. Second, the agent’s incentive for giving decreases when his parent receives
social security transfers. For simplicity the productivity shock is assumed to be the same across
all children, which means the productivity shock only refers to the family shock in this paper.
Let β be the discount factor and γ be the relative weight on the altruism function. Agents don’t
derive utility in childhood; they are taken care of by their parents in this period. The cost of
child-rearing is parental time, b. Thus the budget constraints for the middle age and the old age
are respectively:
dit + st + c
m
t = Wt
i
t(1− τ)(1− bnt), (3)
9This implies that social security benefits depend on the agent’s own earning ability, such as the one in the
U.S.. Strictly speaking, in the U.S., social security benefits depend on actual lifetime earnings, which is a bit
different from earning ability in the model. However, we abstract from this difference since labor supply only
differ slightly across agents in the model.
10In other words, we assume that middle-age children play a noncooperative game when they make old-age
transfer decisions (see Boldrin and Jones 2002). Note that fertility is a continuous variable in the benchmark
model, and a continuous number of children playing a noncooperative game could be a bit problematic. This
is a feature of the Boldrin-Jones type model of fertility. Following Boldrin and Jones (2002), we use symmetry
for old-age transfers of children when we actually compute the model. In the appendix, we will show that this
problem does not significantly affect our results by studying a version of the model with discrete fertility and
heterogenous preference.
11A justification for this assumption is that a parent’s saving is private information that is not available to his
children. If the parent plays strategically with his children, corner solutions may yield higher utility. The parent
may choose either zero savings or zero fertility, which is in stark contrast to the reality. We hypothesize that this
extreme result arises because we do not include parental altruism in the model. Lagerlof (1997) analyzes this type
of problem in a very similar framework.
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cot+1 = Rt+1st + Tt+1(
i
t) + ntDt+1(
i
t, nt, t+1), (4)
where Dt+1(., ., .) is the children’s policy function for old-age transfers in period t + 1, n is the
fertility choice, and s is saving. They satisfy the conditions: s ≥ 0, and n ∈ [0, n̂], where n̂ is the
upper limit for fertility choice.12 The agent’s problem (P1) can be formulated as a Bellman’s
equation,
V (t−1, nt−1, it) = max
d,n,s
u(cmt ) + βE[u(c
o
t+1)|it] + γu(
nt−1∑
j 6=i,j=1
djt + Tt(t−1) + d
i
t)
subject to (3) and (4).
The productivity shock t ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}, is governed by a Markov chain with transition
matrix pi(i, j) = Prob(t+1 = j |t = i). The Markov chain is approximated from the log-normal
AR(1) process
lnt+1 = ρlnt + ut+1, ut+1 ∼ N(0, σ2u), ∀t (5)
where ρ is the intergenerational persistence of productivity, and ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Production is undertaken in a firm in accordance with
Yt = Kαt (ALt)
1−α, (6)
where Kt is aggregate capital in period t, and Lt is aggregate labor in period t. Let A denote the
labor-augmented productivity factor, which is assumed to be constant. In other words, there is
no technological progress in the benchmark model.13 Let α ∈ (0, 1), and let capital depreciate
at a rate of δ. The firm chooses inputs by maximizing profits, Yt −WtLt − (Rt − 1 + δ)Kt.
Denote the distribution of the middle-age generation by a density function φt(t−1, nt−1, t).
Then the aggregate population of the middle-aged generation, Nt, evolves over time according
to:
Nt+1 = Nt
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
∫ n̂
0
φt(j , n, i)Gt(j , n, i)dn, (7)
where G(., ., .) is the middle-age agent’s policy function for fertility in period t. Here population
growth can be easily derived from equation (7): n˜t =
∑m
j=1
∑m
i=1
∫ n̂
0 φt(j , n, i)Gt(j , n, i)dn.
The density function φt(t−1, nt−1, t) evolves according to:
φt+1(j , nt, t+1 = i) =
∑m
l=1 pi(j, i)
∫ n̂
0 φt(l, n, j)Gt(l, n, j)I(Gt(l, n, j) = nt)dn∑m
l=1
∫ n̂
0 φt(l, n, j)Gt(l, n, j)dn
. (8)
Here, I(.) is the indicator function.
12Here n̂ can be understood as the physical limit, which satisfies n̂ ≤ 1/b.
13We add technological progress in the fifth section where we calibrate the model to the US data.
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Denote the policy function for saving by H(., ., .), the market clearing conditions for capital
and labor are:
Kt+1 = Nt
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
∫ n̂
0
φt(j , n, i)Ht(j , n, i)dn, (9)
and:
Lt+1 = Nt+1
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
∫ n̂
0
φt+1(j , n, i)i(1− bGt+1(j , n, i))dn. (10)
The social security system is characterized by a payroll tax rate τt, and a benefit formula
Tt(t−1). Note that Tt(t−1) is the social security payment to the old-age agents in period t,
which is a function of the old-age agent’s productivity, and the social security payments are
financed via the payroll tax τ on the middle age agents. The government’s balanced budget
constraint is as follows,
Nt−1
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∫ nˆ
0
φt−1(j , n, i)Tt(i)dn = WtLtτt. (11)
The left-hand side is the total social security payments in period t. The right-hand side is the
total social security revenue in period t.
Definition 1 a competitive equilibrium: Given an initial distribution of a middle-
age generation φ0(−1, n−1, 0), an initial stock of physical capital K0, and an initial popula-
tion of the middle-age generation N0, a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of prices
{Wt, Rt}, government parameters {τt, Tt(.)}, aggregate quantities {Lt,Kt+1, Nt+1}, distributions
φt+1(t, nt, t+1) and policy functions {Dt(., ., .), Gt(., ., .), Ht(., ., .)} such that:
1. the policy functions {D(., ., .), G(., ., .), H(., ., .)} solve the agent’s problem (P1);
2. the firm’s choices Lt and Kt maximize profits;
3. the prices Wt and Rt are such that markets clear, i.e. conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied;
4. the distribution evolves according to (8) ; and population, Nt, evolves according to (7); and
5. the government budget constraint (11) is satisfied.
Definition 2 a stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium where the density
function, φ(., ., .), prices , R and W , and social security parameters, τ and T , are all constant
over time, and given the same prices and government parameters, agents of different generations
share the same policy function for the transfer to old-age parents D(., ., .). Thus population grows
at a constant rate.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on stationary equilibria.
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3 Key Forces Underlying Differential Fertility
In this section, we analytically show why the poor choose to have more children than the rich
in the model. The first order conditions (FOC) for the individual’s problem are the following,
u′(cmt ) = γu
′(
nt−1∑
j 6=i,j=1
djt + Tt(t−1) + d
i
t), (12)
u′(cmt ) = βRt+1E[u(c
o
t+1)|it], (13)
u′(cmt )bWt
i
t(1− τ) = βE[u′(cot+1)(Dt+1(., ., .) + ntD′t+1(., ., .))|it], (14)
where u′() represents the first order derivative. Equation (12) is the FOC for the transfer choice,
d. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of the transfers, and the right-hand side is the marginal
benefit of the transfers. The FOC clearly implies that agents reduce their transfers when their
parents receive more transfers from other sources, such as their siblings or the social security
program. Agents also reduce their transfers when they have lower earnings. Equation (13) is
the FOC for the saving choice, which is a standard Euler equation. Equation (14) is the FOC
for the fertility choice. The left-hand side of the equation is the marginal loss of having children.
The right-hand side is the marginal benefit of having children. As can be seen, the uncertainty
surrounding children’s productivity makes it difficult for us to see how people’s earnings affect
their fertility choices from the FOCs. Therefor, to illustrate the key forces underlying the fertility
differential between the poor and the rich in the model, we use a simplified version of the model.
The simplified version is different in two ways. First, the uncertainty over individual pro-
ductivity is assumed away. For each family i, the intergenerational productivity process follows
the linear equation it+1 = g
iit, where g
i is the intergenerational persistence of productivity (or
earnings), and gi > 0. Second, it is assumed that prices, R and W , are exogenously given and
constant over time. In other words, this is a partial equilibrium model. We also abstract from
social security in this simplified model. Thus the middle-age agent’s problem for family i is the
following:
maxu(cmt ) + βu(c
o
t+1) + γu(
nt−1∑
j 6=i,j=1
djt + d
i
t) (15)
subject to
cmt = W
i
t − st − dt − θtnt (16)
cot+1 = Rst +Dt+1(nt)nt. (17)
Here Dt+1(nt) is children’s decision rule for old-age transfers, which is a function of nt. Note
that θt = Witb. It is easy to see that in a steady state it must be that nt = nt+1, st+1 = g
ist,
9
and dt+1 = gidt for each family i. Proposition 1 highlights the mechanism underlying differential
fertility in this model.
Proposition 1: Suppose that there are two families i and j, with productivity it and 
j
t
respectively. They face intergenerational persistence of productivity, gi and gj, so that it+1 = g
iit
and jt+1 = g
jjt , for all t. Then the following two statements are true:
1. If gi = gj, then in the steady state the two families have the same fertility rate, ni = nj,
regardless of their productivity levels.
2. If gj < gi < R(1 + β) , then in the steady state family i has a higher fertility rate than
family j, ni > nj, regardless of their productivity levels.
Proof : in appendix 1.
The key message of this proposition is that the intergenerational persistence of earnings is all
that matters for the family’s fertility choice. The first statement implies that a poor household
has the same fertility rate as a rich household if it has the same intergenerational persistence of
productivity as the rich household. The second statement says that a household facing a steeper
upward intergenerational productivity process has more children, regardless of the productivity
levels. The two statements together tell us that the poor have more children not because they
are poor, but because they are expecting an increasing intergenerational earnings process.14
4 Differential Effects of Social Security
In this section, we first demonstrate that the negative relationship between fertility and earnings
remains when we incorporate the general equilibrium effects and uncertainty. We then illustrate
the effect of social security on differential fertility and its further implications for the dynamics of
the earnings distribution. We rely on numerical methods. Specifically, we answer the following
two questions:
1. How does the cross-sectional relationship between fertility and earnings change as the size
of social security increases?
2. How does the earnings distribution change as the size of social security increases?
14Proposition 1 tells us that the mean reversion of earnings over generations can generate a negative cross-
sectional relationship between fertility and earnings. This is not only true in the “old-age security” type model
of fertility. Zhao (2008) shows that the mean reversion of earnings over generations can also generate a negative
relationship between fertility and earnings in the Barro-Becker type model of fertility.
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4.1 Parameterization
First of all, we need to parameterize the model. There are in total 8 model parameters (see
table 1). We choose their values either based on empirical estimates or directly from previous
related literature.
Table 1: Benchmark model Parameterization
Fixed Parameter Value Source
A 1.0 normalization
α 0.33 capital share
Depreciation rate: δ 0.08 BDJ (2005)
Discount factor: β 0.99 (yearly) BDJ (2005)
Time cost : b 0.03 BDJ (2005)
Intergen. corr.: ρ 0.667 Zimmerman (1992)
σµ 0.45 lifetime earnings Gini: 0.31
Altruism weight: γ 1.0 normalization
Note: BDJ (2005) refers to Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005).
As was shown in Proposition 1, an important parameter in this model is the intergenerational
persistence of productivity (ability), ρ, which affects the cross-sectional relationship between
fertility and earnings. We set it to 0.667 according to Zimmermann (1992). Another important
parameter is the time cost of child-rearing, b, which is set to 0.03 based on Boldrin, De Nardi
and Jones (2005). Though a value of b = 0.03 seems surprisingly low, it is actually appropriate
since b refers to the fraction of the total time available to work during the entire working life
(see Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) for detailed explanation). The standard deviation of
lifetime productivity σµ is set to 0.45 so that the Gini coefficient of lifetime earnings is 0.31 in
the model.15 For simplicity, we set γ to one, and normalize A to one. Since the rest of the
parameters α, β, and δ are all fairly standard, we choose their values to be consistent with
previous literature (see Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)). To get the transition matrix of ,
we discretize the AR(1) process and convert it to nine-state Markov chains according to Tauchen
(1986). A model period is set to 20 years.
In this section, the social security benefit formula, T (.), is assumed to be constant across
the distribution of earnings. This means that the old-age agents get lump-sum payments from
the social security system. This benefit formula is very close to the pension system in New
Zealand and Ireland (see OECD 2007), but a bit different from the U.S. one. The latter is
15See Bowlus and Robin (2004) for a detailed description of the empirical literature on lifetime earnings in-
equality.
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less progressive, which will be discussed in next section in detail. All the parameter values are
summarized in table 1. This set of parameter values implies a yearly interest rate of 6.0%, and
a capital-output ratio of 2.36 in the stationary equilibrium (when τ = 0). We also find that
the negative cross-sectional relationship between fertility and earnings remains in the complete
model (see figure 3).
To understand the effects of social security, we simply compare stationary equilibria with
different levels of social security (more specifically, different levels of the social security tax rate
τ). Figures 2 plots the relationships between τ and the several aggregate variables: the interest
rate, the capital-out ratio, the TFR, and the average earnings. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) show that
when τ increases from 0 to 20%, the interest rate (yearly) slightly decreases from 6.0% to 5.0%,
and the capital-output ratio increases 0.18 from 2.36 to 2.54. Figure 2(c) and 2(d) show that the
TFR drops 0.9 from 2.79 to 1.89 and the average earnings increase by 35% from 0.22 to 0.3. One
important thing worth mentioning here is that, in contrast to the previous literature on social
security (see Martin Feldstein 1974), the interest rate slightly decreases as the size of the social
security program increases. The traditional wisdom says the social security payments crowd
out the private life-cycle savings, and increase the interest rate. However, in this model, the
social security payments reduce not only the private life-cycle savings, but also the fertility rate
which is directly related to the labor supply in the next period. Furthermore, the social security
payments also weaken children’s incentives to give old-age transfers, which cause the parents
to further substitute some children for their own savings in their old-age portfolios. Thus the
social security payments may reduce the next period’s labor supply (by reducing the fertility
rate) proportionately more than the private life-cycle savings, which drives down the interest
rate.
4.2 Differential fertility
Figure 3 plots the fertility-earnings relationships for different levels of social security. It demon-
strates that the fertility of those at the low end of the distribution declines much more than
other people when the social security tax rate increases. The difference in fertility change makes
the fertility-earnings curve flatter when τ increases. This point can be best seen in Table 2,
which summarizes the fertility changes of agents with different levels of earning shock as τ in-
creases from 0 to 10%. We can see that fertility declines the most for the agents with the lowest
productivity, and the drop in fertility gets smaller as  increases. There is no drop in fertility at
all for the agent with the highest level of earnings shock.
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Table 2: Fertility changes by earning shock  (τ : 0 → 10%)
Earning shock (1 < 2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fertility drop (%) 34.9% 25.6% 21.6% 17.6% 12.5% 10.0% 7.1% 3.8% 0.0%
4.3 Dynamics of the earnings distribution
When taking into account differential fertility, social security affects the earnings distribution
through two channels. First, social security changes the composition of the population in the
stationary equilibrium by reducing the fertility differential between the rich and the poor. This
compositional effect can be best observed by looking at the earnings distributions corresponding
to different values of social security tax rate τ (see figure 4). As can be seen, the distribution
shifts to the right when the social security tax rate τ increases. The density of poor people
decreases as the density of rich people increases. In other words, there are fewer poor people in
the population as the size of social security expands. The intuition behind this compositional
change is as follows. Since earnings are correlated over generations, the poor tend to have
children who are also relatively poor. Therefore, when fertility of the poor drops proportionally
more than the rich, the portion of poor people in the whole population goes down.
The second channel is that social security increases people’s work time by reducing their
time devoted to child-rearing. Due to social security’s differential effects on fertility, the work
time of poor people increases more than that of the rich, and so do their earnings. Table 3 shows
this effect clearly. When τ increases from 0 to 20%, the earnings of the least productive people
increase by 3.7%, and the earnings of the most productive people increase 0.1%.
We can see that social security does not have significant impacts on the earnings distribution
through the second channel, and its main effect on the earnings distribution is the compositional
effect via changing differential fertility.
Table 3: Earnings changes by earning shock  (τ : 0 → 20%)
Earning shock (1 < 2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Earnings increase (%) 3.7% 2.6% 2.1% 1.4% 1.0% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1%
The changes in the earnings distribution lead to corresponding changes in the average earn-
ings of the economy. Since there are fewer low income people as τ rises, the average earnings
increase as the social security tax τ increases (see figure 2(d)).16
16Note that part of the increase in average earnings is also due to the small increases in wage and labor supply.
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Since we abstract from technological progress, there is no economic growth in stationary
equilibria in this model. However, an increase in the size of social security can generate sizable
economic growth on the transition path between two stationary equilibria. We can see in figure
2(d), when the social security tax rate increases from 0% to 10%, the average earnings increase
by 17%. A further increase from 10% to 20 % will lead to a 15% increase in average earnings.
Furthermore, since one model period corresponds to one generation, the growth on the transition
path may last over decades.
5 Compression of Fertility: an experiment
In this section, we apply our model to the U.S. data. Jones and Tertilt (2007) document a
negative cross-sectional relationship between fertility and income for all five-year cohorts of
women since 1826 in the U.S. One of their main findings is that there is a dramatic compression
in fertility by income since the cohort of women born at the end of the 19th century. In other
words, the fertility differential between the rich and the poor experienced a massive decline over
this period. They call this fact “compression of fertility”, and it can be clearly seen in figure 5
(taken from Jones and Tertilt (2007)). In figure 5, the bottom half curve represents the average
fertility rate of women at the bottom half of the income distribution, and the top half curve
represents the average fertility rate of women at the top half of the income distribution.17 The
horizontal axis is the birth year of women. Here each year represents a five-year period (i.e. 1893
represents 1891-1895). We can see the gap between the two curves started to shrink dramatically
since the cohort of women born between 1891-1895.
We hypothesize that the “compression of fertility” is partially caused by the implementation
of the government-provided social security program in the U.S. since 1935. We can see this
clearly in figure 6, in which we use 35 years old as the cohort year and plot the fertility gap
between the top half and the bottom half of the earnings distribution for all cohorts of women
born after 1826. We can see clearly that the fertility gap starts to drop dramatically in the
1930s, which coincides with the beginning of the U.S. social security program in 1935 (denoted
by the red line). Since 1935, the size of the U.S. social security program gradually increased to
above 7% of the GDP in 2000 (see Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)), while the fertility gap
dropped from around one child to 0.2 child.18
We run a computational experiment with our model to see how much social security can
17Income is measured by the husband’s Occupational Income (OI), which is a variable available in the census
data. OI is a good proxy for lifetime earnings compared to other one-year earnings measurements.
18As a measurement of differential fertility, the bottom-top fertility gap has one problem: it is sensitive to the
TFR of the cohort, which also falls over the last several decades. Therefore, we also look at the income elasticity
of fertility in our computational experiment. Income elasticity of fertility is measured by the regression coefficient
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Table 4: Fertility changes between two cohorts: 1891-1895 VS 1946-1950
Two cohorts of
women All Bottom half Top half
Bottom-top
fertility differential
Income elas. of
fertility
1891-1895 3.048 3.512 2.584 0.928 -0.44
1946-1950 2.218 2.348 2.088 0.260 -0.20
Decline (#) 0.83 1.16 0.50 0.67 -0.24
Decline(%) 27% 33% 19% 72% 55%
Bottom half:  the average fertility rate of women in the bottom half of the income distribution;
Top half:  the average fertility rate of women in the top half of the income distribution;
Income elasticity of fertility:  the regression coefficient of the log fertility on the log income.
(Data source: Jones and Tertilt (2007))
account for this “compression of fertility”. Specifically, we focus on the fertility changes between
two cohorts of women: 1891-1895 and 1946-1950.19 Table 4 demonstrates the fertility changes
between these two cohorts of women. We can see that while the fertility of women in the
bottom half of income distribution declines by 33%, the fertility of the top half only declines
19% between these two cohorts of women. The differential changes in fertility by income lead to
the result that the top-bottom fertility differential shrinks from 0.928 to 0.260 between these two
cohorts, and income elasticity of fertility declines by 0.24. Our experiment aims at understanding
quantitatively how much social security can explain these changes between cohorts. We assume
that the 1891-1895 cohort of women live in an economy without social security, and the 1946-
1950 cohort of women live in an economy with a social security system similar to the current one
in the U.S.20 Our strategy in the computational experiment is as follows. First, we recalibrate
our model so that the stationary equilibrium captures the key characteristics of the cohort of
from the following regression:
log(Fi) = b0 + b1log(Ii) + i, (18)
where Fi is the fertility rate and Ii is the income. Jones and Tertilt calculated the income elasticities of fertility for
all cohorts of women since 1826. These are plotted in figure 7. We can also see a clear drop in income elasticity of
fertility since 1935. By definition, income elasticity of fertility is not sensitive to proportional changes in fertility
across the earnings distribution. Therefore, the drop in income elasticity of fertility means that the “compression
of fertility” is not due to the drop in TFR in the twentieth century.
19Following the suggestion of Jones and Tertilt (2007), we do not consider the latest two cohorts of women. The
reason is that their fertility are computed from the 1990 census, and they may not have completed their fertility
yet.
20We argue that what really matters to women’s lifetime fertility decision is the social security system at the
end of their fecund period.
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Table 5: Model-data comparisons
Cohort year/SS tax rate 1891-1895/0% 1946-1950/10% The changes b/w two cohorts
Data Model Data Model Data Model Model/Data
Bottom half 3.512 3.060 2.348 2.336
Top half 2.584 2.580 2.088 2.070
The bottom-top gap 0.928 0.481 0.260 0.266 0.67 0.21 32%
Income elasticity of fertility -0.44 -0.17 -0.20 -0.11 -0.24 -0.06 25%
Bottom half:  the average fertility rate of women in the bottom half of the income distribution;
Top half:  the average fertility rate of women in the top half of the income distribution;
The bottom-top gap:  the fertility difference between the bottom half and the top half;
Income elasticity of fertility:  the regression coefficient of the log fertility on the log income.
Cohort Total Fertility Rate 3.048 2.841 2.218 2.200 0.830 0.641 77%
Cohort year/SS tax rate
1891-1895/0% 1946-1950/10% The changes b/w two cohorts
Income elasticity of fertility Data Model Data Model Data Model Model/Data
The bottom-top gap -0.50 -0.28 -0.17 -0.16 0.28 0.12 37.01%
(Data source: Jones and Tertilt (2007))
women born during 1946-1950. Then, we take away the social security system and compute the
new stationary equilibrium. We compare the changes between two equilibria in the model with
the changes between two cohorts of women in the data.
To model the current social security system in the U.S., we follow Hugget and Ventura
(1999) and Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007). The social security tax rate, τ , is
set to 10%. The social security benefit formula is as follows: the marginal replacement rate
is 90% for earnings lower than 20% of the economy’s average earnings. From 20% to 125%
of the economy’s average earnings, the marginal replacement rate is 33%, and the marginal
replacement rate is 15% from 125% to 246% of the economy’s average earnings. Above 246%
of the economy’s average earnings, the marginal replacement rate is zero.21 We also match the
top-bottom fertility gap within the 1946-1950 cohort of women: 0.26, by resetting ρ to 0.79.
Then we choose the altruism weight, γ, to 0.78 so that the model matches the average fertility
rate of the whole cohort: 2.2. Lastly, we assume that the labor-augmented productivity factor,
A, grows at the rate of 2% yearly to match the postwar U.S. data.
Table 5 summarizes the results of the experiment. We find that 32% of the decline in
differential fertility between the two cohorts can be explained by social security. When looking
at the income elasticity of fertility, 25% of its drop can be accounted for by social security.
21Note that the demographic structure in our model is different from the data. In the model, agents’ retirement
period is as long as their working period. This difference makes it impossible to balance the government’s budget
if we want to match both the social security tax rate and its benefit levels. Therefore, we choose to only match
the social security tax rate, and then scale down the social security benefit levels to balance the government’s
budget. By doing so, we leave the social security system’s progressivity constant.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effects that government-provided social security has on differential
fertility (by income) and its implications for the dynamics of the earnings distribution. As shown
in previous literature, social security has negative effects on fertility when children are treated
as parents’ old-age security (see Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005)). We find that given its
redistributional property, social security reduces the fertility of the poor proportionally more
than that of the rich, and therefore reduces the fertility differential between the poor and the
rich. We further show that this reduction in differential fertility generates a new stationary
distribution with a smaller proportion of poor people and raises the economy’s average earnings.
We apply the model to the U.S. data and find that in the model social security can account
for 32% of the decline in the top-bottom fertility differential between the cohort of women born
in 1891-1895 and the cohort of women born in 1946-1950 in the U.S. It is easy to see that
in this framework, rearing children and saving are two alternative ways to secure people’s old
age. A change in fertility distribution should be strongly correlated to changes in the wealth
distribution. Hence, we expect that the impact of social security on differential fertility will
also have significant implications for the dynamics of the wealth distribution. We leave this
hypothesis for future research.
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7 Appendix 1: proof of proposition 1
At the steady state, the FOCs of the middle-age agent’s problem are:
1∑nt−1
j 6=i,j=1 d
j
t + dit
=
1
cmt
(19)
Rβ
1
cot+1
=
1
cmt
(20)
∂cot+1
∂nt
β
1
cot+1
=
θt
cmt
(21)
Imposing symmetry in siblings’ transfer decisions, and rearranging the FOCs above gives:
nt−1dt = cmt (22)
Rβcmt = c
o
t+1 (23)
∂cot+1
∂nt
βcmt = θtc
o
t+1 (24)
Substituting in the budget constraint (17) and solving equation (22) for dt gives:
dt =
1
1 + nt−1
(Wit − st − θtnt) (25)
Substituting this into the old age budget constraint gives:
cot = Rst−1 +
nt−1
1 + nt−1
(Wit − st − θtnt) (26)
After some algebra, we obtain the rate of return on children:
∂cot+1
∂nt
=
1
(1 + nt)2
(Wit+1 − st+1 − θt+1nt+1) (27)
Remember that at steady state we have the following conditions: nt = nt+1, st+1 = gist,
and dt+1 = gidt for each family i. Dropping the time index, substituting in the rate of return
on children, and combining equations (23)and (24) gives:
θiR = gi
1
(1 + ni)2
(Wi − si − θini) (28)
Combining equations (22) and (23), and some algebra gives:
si =
ni
ni+1
(Wi − θini)(βR− gi)
R+ ni
ni+1
(βR− gi) (29)
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By substituting (29) into (28), we cancel out si and get the following equation:
(R2 +R(βR− gi))(ni)2 + (2R2 +R2β)ni +R2 − g
iR
b
= 0 (30)
Equation (30) is the equation determining the fertility choice of the family i. We can see equation
(30) does not contain i. The only family-specific parameter it contains is gi. Thus it is obvious
that, for any two families i and j with gi = gj , we have ni = nj , regardless of the levels of i
and j . The first statement is proved.
The second statement says if R+Rβ > gi is satisfied, ni increases as gi increases. To prove
it, we first need to derive ∂n
i
∂gi
. We get ∂n
i
∂gi
by applying implicit function theorem to equation
(30).
∂ni
∂gi
= −
∂F (,)
∂gi
∂F (,)
∂ni
=
R(ni)2 + Rb
2(R2 +R(βR− gi))ni + 2R2 +R2β (31)
It can be easily seen that, ∂n
i
∂gi
> 0, if R2 +R(βR− gi) > 0, or R+Rβ > gi. Q.E.D.
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8 Appendix 2: discrete fertility choice
As we said in footnote 10, assuming continuous fertility may cause a measurement problem. We
take a shortcut by using symmetry for old-age transfers of children when we actually solve the
model. In order to show that this problem does not significantly affect our results, we study a
version of the model with discrete fertility choice and heterogenous preference. In this version
of the model, agents also differ by altruism toward their parents (γ). The middle-age agent’s
problem can be written as follows:
V (t−1, nt−1, it, γ
i
t) = max
d,n,s
u(cmt ) + βE[u(c
o
t+1)|it, γit ] + γitu(
nt−1∑
j 6=i,j=1
djt + Tt(t−1) + d
i
t)
subject to
dit + st + c
m
t = Wt
i
t(1− τ)(1− bnt), (32)
cot+1 = Rt+1st + Tt+1(
i
t) + ntDt+1(
i
t, nt, t+1, γt+1). (33)
Here the altruism weight γt ∈ {γ1, γ2, ..., γm}, is governed by a Markov chain with transition
matrix piγ(i, j) = Prob(γt+1 = γj |γt = γi). The Markov chain is approximated from the AR(1)
process
γt+1 = (1− ργ)µ+ ργγt + νt+1, νt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2ν),∀t, (34)
where µ is the unconditional mean of γ, ν is the standard deviation, and ρ is the time persistence
coefficient. We set µ to one, ν to 0.2, and ργ to 0.667, and compute this version of the model (the
rest of parameter values are the same as those in the benchmark parameterization). Figure 8
and 9 show the analogs of the results presented in figure 3 and 4. We find that this version of the
model produces very similar results as the benchmark model does. This means that assuming
continuous fertility does not significantly affect our results.
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Figure 1: Differential fertility by income in the U.S.: 1826-1960. (from Jones and Tertilt (2007))
regression) based on data from all cohorts. The relationship between CEB and OI looks
surprisingly time invariant. The estimated relationship is log(CEB) = 4.82−0.38 log(OI)
with an extremely high R2 of 0.82.34 Therefore, much of the observed overall fertility
change seen between the 1828 and 1958 birth cohorts seems consistent with this view.35
Figure 5: Log (CEB) by Log(Occupational Income)
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However, the picture also shows systematic deviations from such a stable relationship.
34Clearly, this relationship cannot hold exactly on the individual level, even with error. This is because
there are individual level observations for which CEB = 0, and hence, for these observations, log(CEB)
is not well defined. To get around this issue we first compute averages by income deciles to get a
smooth measure of fertility which might be a better representation of desired fertility than individual
fertility outcomes which are affected by the indivisibility of children as well as involuntary infertility.
We then estimate the relationship E[log(CEB)] = β0 + β1 log(AOI) using the decile averages for each
cohort. An alternative, which would add considerable complication, would be to assume that E[CEB] =
α0 + α1AOIα2 which generalizes the above form. This would allow for values of CEB = 0 but would
imply (among other things) that the elasticity of children with respect to income would depend on the
level of income. To avoid this extra difficulty, the log-log form was used here and should be viewed as
only an approximation.
35Schultz (2007) also documents a relatively time-invariant relationship between income and fertility
in cross-country data from 1960 and 2000.
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Figure 2: Aggregate variables and the SS tax
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Figure 3: Differential fertility and the SS tax
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Figure 4: Earnings distribution and the SS tax 
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Figure 5: Fertility by top and bottom half of income distribution in the U.S.: 1826-1960.
(From Jones and Tertilt (2007))
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Figure 6: Fertility gap over time in the U.S.
(Data source: Jones and Tertilt (2007))
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
186
3
186
8
187
3
187
8
188
3
188
8
189
3
189
8
190
3
190
8
191
3
191
8
192
3
192
8
193
3
193
8
194
3
194
8
195
3
195
8
196
3
196
8
197
3
197
8
198
3
198
8
Cohort Year (35 years old)
B o
t t
o m
- T
o p
 F
e r
t i
l i
t y
 G
a p
the bottom-top
fertility gap
1935
27
Figure 7: Income elasticities of fertility over time in the U.S.
(Data source: Jones and Tertilt (2007))
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Figure 8: Differential fertility and the SS tax (discrete fertility choice)
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Figure 9: Earnings distribution and the SS tax (discrete fertility choice)
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